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Abstract 
This paper examines the operation of an accreditation programme for hospitals in Iran. It explores the 
process of accreditation as a regulatory control system and analyses hospitals’ responses to this type of 
control. We draw on the notion of steering and argue that the accreditation system is transactional in 
nature. Our findings show that hospitals conform to the scheme, although they also resist some of its 
requirements. On a wider policy level, we suggest that accreditations offer the accreditor the opportunity 
to impact on how activities are undertaken, but hospitals require incentives in order to make the 
necessary organisational changes. 
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1. Introduction 
Regulatory control systems exist in many forms and are broadly aimed at directing organisations towards 
meeting societal objectives (Broadbent et al., 2010). Whether these goals are achieved often depends on 
both the nature of the controls and also on how the organisations being regulated respond to the controls 
contained within the regulatory system. This paper focuses on one particular system of regulation, that 
of accreditation. Accreditation programmes are regulatory control systems aimed at assessing 
organisational performance against explicit standards (Shaw, 2004c; de Walcque et al., 2008; Pomey et 
al., 2010; Braithwaite et al., 2010; 2012). In many countries, accreditation programmes represent an 
endorsement of the quality of provision of a service and are often voluntarily pursued by organisations 
for this very purpose. For example, many UK Business Schools seek accreditation from the Association 
of Business Schools (AMBA and EQUIS) for this purpose (Cooper et al., 2014; Zammuto, 2008; Cret, 
2011; Urgel, 2007). This paper, however, examines Iran’s national accreditation programme for 
healthcare organizations which is the sole regulatory control mechanism used to promote quality and 
safety in hospitals across the country. 
All accreditation systems provide certifications for compliance and for the meeting of pre-set standards 
(Shaw, 2004; de Walcque et al., 2008; Pomey et al., 2010; Braithwaite et al., 2010; 2012). The processes 
underpinning the attainment of the accreditation certificate, arguably, are regulatory control processes 
containing an assessment and evaluation of organisational performance against prior established 
standards.  Previous research provides mixed messages about the nature of this control. For example, 
Touati and Pomey (2009) compare French and Canadian hospital accreditation systems and argue that 
both systems show signs of bureaucratic coercion. Hinchcliffe et al., (2012) acknowledges that 
accreditations are complex organizational interventions and suggest that there are contrasting messages 
about the extent to which professional (clinician and managerial) attitudes towards accreditation 
processes impact on the effectiveness of the method in promoting change. Whilst some research reveals 
professionals’ positive views of accreditation leading to improved patient safety and care and also 
positively impacting on staff satisfaction, other research, for example in Egypt, suggests accreditations 
are considered overly expensive, bureaucratic and tend to deter organisational improvements (Al 
Tehewy et al., 2009). The Iranian healthcare accreditation system was introduced in 1997 with similar 
approaches adopted by other countries such as France and Egypt (Giraud, 2001; Touati and Pomey, 
2009). It is a mandatory system intended to evaluate and rate all types of hospitals (both public and 
private) in terms of their performance against pre-set standards. Non-compliance to the accreditation is 
considered an offence that may lead to prosecution (MoH-Ministry of Health, 1997a; Farzianpour et al., 
2011). However, unlike other accreditation programmes, the Iranian system includes a significant 
number of religious standards in addition to the clinical and organisational standards, against which 
hospitals’ performance is compared. This provides an interesting context in which to explore the 
perceptions of hospital staff towards accreditation as a regulatory control mechanism, mainly because 
research has pointed to the re-emergence of religion in the public sphere (e.g. Beckford and Richardson, 
2007; Boehle, 2010; Lewis, 2001; Kamla et al., 2006). 
The aim of this paper is to gain an understanding of the perceptions of the organisational members in 
relation to the accreditation system, and to assess the extent to which they consider the system as 
transactional or relational. In order to do so, we analyse the views of clinicians and managers working 
in eight hospitals; six of which are publicly funded whilst two are private. We analyse their perceptions 
about the development and application of the accreditation standards, the periodic review process used 
to implement the accreditation system as well as the outcomes from the accreditation visit. Our findings 
show hospital participants complying with the requirements of the accreditation whilst at the same time 
resisting some of the requirements of the process. The main novel finding is that religion plays an 
important role in this context, explicating and ensuring conformity to external controls. On the other 
hand, resistance occurs because participants observe that the standards against which they are measured 
are not reflective of their organisational or national capabilities.  
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The paper adopts Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2013) notions of “steering”1 to theorise the findings, 
arguing that accreditation programmes are examples of “societal steering mechanisms” that seek to 
regulate and control the activities of organisations (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013, page 66). These 
steering mechanisms may be transactional, supported by the force of law or funding, or may be 
negotiated and relational. Societal steering mechanisms, as explained later, create environmental 
disturbances for organisations that may lead to four possible responses: rebuttal, reorientation, 
colonisation or evolution (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013; Laughlin, 1991). This theoretical framing 
enables an analysis of the nature of accreditation as a form of regulation, as well as an analysis of the 
responses the organisations make to them. Our central argument is that in Iran hospitals conform to 
accreditation because of the force of the law, the funding ramifications associated with the regulation 
and also because of shared religious values. Despite this, there is a latent resistance because the desired 
organisational standards contained in the accreditation steers are perceived as unrealistic and 
unattainable and out of synch with organisational values. 
Our paper contributes to the control literature in two ways – conceptually and empirically. Conceptually 
because, while previous literature have suggested that transactional steering may achieve its societal 
goals due to the force of law and funding, we argue that strong shared values (in this case Islamic values) 
may also lead to conformity to transactional steering. Whilst there may be resistance to transactional 
steering systems, such resistance may be mediated by shared religious values. These have a moderating 
effect on the way societal steering control mechanisms such as accreditation are perceived by 
organisational members. At an empirical level, we contribute to the understanding of reorientation 
strategies in a developing country and within an Islamic context. Whilst Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) 
explain reorientation through absorption and boundary management, we introduce reorientation through 
both conformity and resistance, without any specific organisational processes changing. These 
contributions are important for two reasons - the dearth of research considering the perception of 
participants to the control elements contained in accreditation programmes, despite the fact that 
accreditation is the longest-established and most widely-known method of evaluation of healthcare 
services in the world (e.g. WHO-World Health Organisation), 2003; Shaw, 2004b; Shaw, 2004c; 
Scrivens and Lodge, 1997 & many others) and given the scarcity of research related to accreditation 
programmes in developing countries (Hopper et al., 2008; Hoque, 2014).  
The paper consists of six sections. The next part discusses accreditation systems generally and also 
specifically in terms of healthcare. An argument is made as to why they can be considered regulatory 
control systems. In section three we explain the main elements of Broadbent and Laughlin's (2013) 
theoretical framework, whilst in section four we discuss our research methods, including a contextual 
introduction to the Iranian healthcare accreditation system. Section five provides our empirical findings 
and our analysis of organisational responses to this mechanism. We conclude the paper by discussing 
the findings and addressing the implications for policy and further research in section six. 
2. Accreditations and Regulatory Control Systems 
2.1. The nature of accreditation systems 
In broad terms, accreditations are external assessments of a service provision. They intend to provide an 
external endorsement to the organisation, thus its services and outcomes can meet prescribed thresholds. 
In the education sector, for example, accreditations are external quality reviews used to scrutinize 
institutions and education programmes with the goal of improving the quality of provision (Cooper et 
al., 2014; Eaton, 2006; Stensaker and Harvey, 2006; Invargson et al., 2006). The first attempts to use 
                                                          
1 The work of Broadbent and Laughlin with respect to steering was presented in several academic articles, and 
they collated all their work in a single text in 2013 - i.e. Broadbent and Laughlin (2013).  
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accreditation date back to 1910 in the United States (McIntyre et al., 2001) and soon it was replicated in 
other English-speaking countries, such as Canada (in 1958), Australia (1974), and then in Europe (Shaw 
and Brooks, 1991; Giraud, 2001), Latin America (Arce, 1999), Africa (Whittaker et al., 1998) and South 
East Asia (Ito et al., 1998; Huang et al., 2000). A significant amount of accreditation takes place in the 
healthcare sector. De Walcque et al. (2008) suggests that healthcare accreditations are “initiatives [that] 
externally assess hospitals against pre-defined explicit published standards in order to encourage 
continuous improvement of the health care quality” (de Walcque et al., 2008, p. i). Where the hospital 
achieves the threshold and compliance is achieved, it receives a certificate of accreditation, which is 
valid for a specific period of time (Scrivens, 1995a).  
Having a certificate of accreditation arguably conveys several benefits for an organisation and the extent 
to which these benefits actually accrue has been widely researched (see for example Montagu, 2003; 
Pomey et al., 2004; Pomey et al., 2010). The benefits can be categorised into those associated with the 
processes of providing and improving healthcare, those associated with the management of healthcare 
organisations, and those associated with external stakeholder perceptions about healthcare. In the first 
category, accreditations may provide the organisation with a validation of excellence and may stimulate 
a focus on improving the quality of care within hospitals. Arguably, this focus on continuous 
improvement is the key goal of accreditation processes. The second group of benefits relates to impacts 
on people working within the organisations. For example, accreditations may provide recognition of the 
skills of personnel; it may motivate workers and may encourage staff education as they become more 
aware of best practices (Duckett, 1983; Cerqueira, 2006). The third category of benefits includes 
facilitating community confidence and improving the reputation of the service provider amongst its end 
users (Montagu, 2003; Pomey et al., 2010). Contained within this last category are suggestions that 
accreditation also enables the organisation to demonstrate public accountability and accountability to 
funders (Halverson, Nicola and Baker, 1998; Cerqueira, 2006).  
A generic accreditation process is depicted in Figure 1 below.  
Accreditations depend on the use of pre-determined standards of performance to measure and assess 
organisational activities against those standards (as shown in Figure 1 below). The choice of standards, 
their focus, and the level at which they are set are paramount in determining the tone, acceptability and 
nature of the system. Accreditation programmes may be focused on standards set for structures, 
processes or health outcomes (Zende, 2006).  The structure approach prioritises the structural facilities 
that are available to the hospital such as equipment, human resources, physical and space specifications 
and layout (i.e. hardware) in hospitals (Haigh and De Graaf, 2009). Standards are, therefore, established 
for these resources. Where processes are used as the standards, the accreditation programme focuses on 
quality assurance activities and the standards concentrate on the process of care, rather than on the 
physical structures. Alternatively, the focus of the accreditation programmes can be on the health 
outcomes, relying on customer’s charters to assess the extent to which the healthcare system is accessible 
and acceptable to patients.   
Fig. 1. Generic accreditation model 
Source: Adapted from Braithwaite et al., 2011, page 2. 
 
The use of standards is aimed at facilitating the systematic reviewing of complex systems. The credibility 
and the effectiveness of accreditation programmes to a large extent depend on the reliability of the 
standards that are chosen to assess the activities. This is because they should facilitate the assessment of 
the current situation and consequently should help to identify the improvements needed to deliver 
healthcare services. Whether they actually do, is debatable and a number of studies have indicated the 
problematic nature of achieving these goals (Scrivens, 1997a; de Walcque et al., 2008). The standards 
are applied against current organisational activities typically by way of self-assessment (such as filling 
out questionnaires), desk appraisal of internal documents and on-site visits, usually by peers (Montagu, 
2003; Braithwaite et al., 2011). 
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Although all accreditations involve external assessment or an assessment by some independent authority 
they need not be obligatory, nor are they necessarily government requirements. The accrediting 
authorities may be public or governmental departments, or their agencies as in the case of healthcare 
accreditation in France and Italy (Montagu, 2003; Pomey et al., 2004; Pomey et al., 2010). But they can 
also be undertaken by private organisations that do not have affiliation to government. Eaton (2006) 
identifies four different types of accrediting bodies in the US education system. These include regional 
or state accreditors; national accreditors; faith based accreditors as well as career or professional 
accreditors. In Europe, Stensaker and Harvey (2006) similarly identify both the existence of private and 
public accrediting bodies. For example, the General Medical Council in the UK is a public accrediting 
body for medical education. Where the accrediting body is a public organisation, the accreditation is 
often compulsory and necessary for operating or providing the service. 
This broad description has shown that accreditations take various forms and that the benefits associated 
with them are by no means certain. Our focus in this paper is on accreditations as an example of a 
regulatory control system and it is to this we now turn. 
2.2. Accreditation as a Regulatory Control System 
Regulatory controls are external controls, which may trigger internal organisational changes (Broadbent 
and Laughlin, 2013). They may take a variety of forms, including legislation to specify requirements, 
use of funding and inspections. Accreditation systems can be considered examples of regulatory control 
systems for several reasons. Firstly, in order to obtain the accreditation, organisations are assessed 
against externally designed standards. The standards are intended to cover all aspects of healthcare 
provision by investigating the organisation in terms of management and clinical performance 
(Braithwaite et al., 2011; Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2008; Pomey et al., 2010; Shaw, 2004b). Many of 
these standards are often defined in the language of control; for example as output standards, input 
standards and process standards that are used to measure the performance of the organisation (Montagu, 
2003; Neely et al., 2001; Brown, 1996). In healthcare accreditation, the output standards reflect the 
outputs expected from the service such as number of patients treated, incidence of infection, accuracy 
of clinical diagnosis, patient satisfaction and may include both quantitative and qualitative measures. 
Input standards concentrate on resources and facilities used to provide the service.  Process standards 
consider how well activities are undertaken and increasingly require continuous improvement in the 
quality of care. Management processes and clinical processes are examined for their effectiveness. With 
this focus on standards and the evaluation of hospital performance across the spectrum of hospital 
activity, accreditations are, in essence, regulatory control systems. The standards act as targets and may 
represent formal controls, “deliberately articulated” for control purposes with the inherent objective of 
fostering change (Chenhall et al., 2010, page 742). Through the examination of achievement of 
performance against standards, accreditation programmes are depending on performance measurement 
systems, as part of management control systems, to exert organisational changes (Zende, 2006; Gifford 
and Garcieri, 2007; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013; Agyemang and Broadbent, forthcoming). Where 
organisations are not successful - i.e. they do not meet the requisite standard after an accreditation 
process, they often are subject to further accreditation visits and reviews.  Even where organisations are 
successful and receive the accreditation certificate, they often are still subject to further visits and 
reviews in subsequent years to ensure that standards are maintained and improved.  
Accreditation systems operate in similar ways to the public management performance measurement 
systems used in many countries in the 1990s as part of the mechanisms of New Public Management 
(Hood, 1991; 1995) to evaluate the performance of public sector organisations. Key similarities include 
the evaluation of organisational performance against a set of criteria, and the systematic appraisal and 
collection of information, frequently undertaken by external bodies. The main difference between 
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accreditation and these other systems, however, relate to the purpose of the evaluation. Hood (2007)2 
suggests that there are three purposes to public sector management by numbers. They may be used as 
targets, with the standards being aspirational. On the other hand, the purpose of collecting the metrics 
may be to rank performance of different organisations in order to inform user choice and to inform 
government action, “or simply as a means for encouraging ‘saints’ and shaming ‘sinners’ (Hood, 2007, 
page 95). Essentially this is ranking for accountability purposes. Performance measures may also be 
collected just for background intelligence information gathering. Annual performance metrics systems, 
such as the UK National Health Service (NHS) trusts star ratings system employed by the UK 
government (which have been published in England since 2001), demonstrate both target setting and 
ranking purposes (Agrizzi, 2008). Where the performance measurement system aims at ranking, the 
external controls and organisational change may be more direct as organisations attempt to avoid the 
“naming and shaming” subsumed in the ranking. The star rating system sought to give the public 
performance information about their local hospitals, but had direct consequences for hospitals when 
found to be “failing” (Agrizzi, 2008). For example, hospitals achieving zero stars were required to 
provide action plans to demonstrate how performance would be improved and, in other instances, senior 
managers were held accountable for low performance and lost their employment (Agrizzi, 2008; Bevan 
and Hood, 2006; Chang, 2007; Mannion et al., 2005). Accreditation systems may be motivated by the 
first purpose where the pre-set standards are aspirational targets of performance. On the other hand, they 
differ from other systems because they emphasise compliance to the standards in order to award 
certification for this compliance, rather than “naming and shaming”. Thus their inherent external control 
may be more hidden and less obvious.  
Literature has shown the potential tension between the use of external measures of performance and 
internal organisational beliefs of what should be measured (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013; Bevan and 
Hood, 2006b). In hospitals for example, the perspective held by some physicians, nurses and scientists, 
is that externally-defined performance measurements are simply unpractical to use (Loeb, 2004). There 
is the argument that medical professionals tend to believe that, what gets measured in healthcare 
organisations is frequently the easiest and cheapest aspects of care, which are commonly of least 
importance in improving quality (Loeb, 2004) and that the intangible and long-lasting outcomes are 
ignored, due to the difficulty of measuring them (De Bruijn, 2002; Fried, 2010).  Furthermore, there is 
the problem that patients with seemingly similar conditions may respond in different ways to similar 
clinical treatment. External pressures through accreditation, as with other external controls, may impact 
on the behaviour of hospital management and medical staff in unintended, perverse, and dysfunctional 
ways (Agrizzi, 2008; Lehtonen, 2007; Conrad and Uslu, 2012; Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Abernethy 
et al., 2007; Kurunmaki, 2004; Modell, 2001).  
Pomey et al. (2004; 2010) have looked at some elements of this by considering whether and how 
accreditations lead to organisational change in hospitals in France. They argue that the mandatory nature 
of the system created strong pressure for change within hospitals, and that it was in the preparation for 
the accreditation visit that some changes could be seen. Hospitals tend to react in bureaucratic ways; 
holding meetings to prepare the standards manual. Despite this, there was evidence of a more a 
consensual and participatory sharing of information and communication between all levels of the 
organisation. Additionally, the process, “translated primarily into the development of values shared by 
the professionals of the hospital and the creation of an organizational environment which is more 
conducive to fostering better treatment of patients” (Pomey et al., 2004, page 122). Finally, they suggest 
that the preparation for accreditation led to the introduction and use of performance indicators in the 
                                                          
2 These are “pure” types but over time many systems have developed hybrid forms combining elements of targets, rankings 
and intelligence. 
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management of activities. Clearly, there was evidence of some acceptance and at least some reorientation 
in the management control systems to handle the pressures introduced by the accreditation system. 
3. Regulatory Control Processes: steering types and organisational responses  
As argued above, accreditations can be considered examples of regulatory control systems used to direct 
internal organisational systems. The work of Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) provides a conceptual lens 
by which the relationships between these controls and organisational responses can be examined. They 
provide a “middle-range thinking” research approach that dwells upon the use of a skeletal theoretical 
framework for studying regulatory control processes (Laughlin, 1995; 2004). Theoretically, Broadbent 
and Laughlin argue that institutions are developed at societal levels to regulate other organisational 
systems. These institutions are government departments that employ financial resources and the 
administrative power of law to direct organisational behaviour. Their role is to act as “societal steering 
media” whilst the organisations they steer have functional responsibilities. Thus, in the case of 
healthcare, a Ministry of Health would be an example of a societal steering medium, while the hospitals 
are the organisations being directed to provide healthcare. Various steering mechanisms (such as 
funding, the law, and we argue, accreditations) may be employed by societal steering media to steer 
organisational activities.   
3.1. Types of steering mechanisms used in regulatory controls 
Broadbent and Laughlin identify two ideal types of steering mechanisms and discuss their nature in 
terms of the underlying rationalities used in their development. Where an instrumental rationality 
underpins the design, transactional steering mechanisms may be developed. Steering processes that take 
the transactional approach define the outputs and outcomes desired (the ends), and may also specify the 
means to be used to achieve these ends. The approach may be illustrated by the regulatory relationship 
that exists in the context of a contract to undertake a particular project over a definable period of time 
(Broadbent et al., 2010, page 508). The objectives of the contract are defined; the process is defined as 
well as the rewards (for achieving the objectives) which are usually financial. Transactional approaches 
have instrumental goals and tend to be “command and control” approaches with the key purpose of 
achieving specified ends operating as a “something for something” and without negotiation between 
stakeholders. Alternatively, where a communicative rationality underpins the development of the 
processes, more relational steering approaches are used based on negotiation and communication, and 
are, therefore, less prescriptive. Thus, the goals of relational steering would have been agreed through 
deliberation and discourse between stakeholders, whilst with transactional steering the purposes are 
achieved through formal (and usually financial) exchanges.  Relational steering is regulative in the sense 
that it is guarantees freedoms, regulating established behaviours and so may be seen as justifiable as 
compared to transactional steering which reduces the freedom by which organisations may act (Laughlin, 
and Broadbent, 1993, page 341; Laughlin, 2007). Transactional and relational steering processes exist 
on a continuum that represents “ideal types” mechanisms.  Table 1 summarises the differences between 
transactional steering and relational steering. 
Table 1. Types of steering processes 
Source: adapted from Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) 
 
3.2. Organisational responses 
Broadbent and Laughlin’s notions of steering enable an unpacking of the complexities of regulatory 
controls and organisational responses because they consider both the tangible structures (such as, 
organisations, laws, and funding regulations, management systems) as well as intangible elements (such 
as shared values) which may help in explaining how people respond. The intangible elements are 
especially important because they are the interpretive schemes that “operate as shared fundamental 
assumptions about why events happen and how people are to act in different situations” (Bartunek, 1984, 
page 355).  In Islamic countries such as Iran, “every act of believers must conform to Islamic Law” 
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(Lewis, 2001, page 104) and therefore these religious values are important interpretive schemes that 
would influence the response organisations make to regulatory controls. They would also supposedly be 
the taken for granted values that are incorporated within the content of the regulatory controls deriving 
from the Iranian government. However, there are different levels of abstraction with respect to 
interpretive schemes that can also impact on the responses to regulatory controls. They can range from 
core processes (communication and decision processes), culture (beliefs, values and norms) to mission 
(purposes and programmes of activities) (Laughlin, 1991, page 213). Therefore, it is possible for 
organisation participants to share the same beliefs and cultural norms (such as religious values) with the 
regulatory controllers and yet hold different organisational values (in terms of view and beliefs about 
mission and purpose) from those being controlled. For example, there may be different “measures of 
quality, relevance or excellence” flowing from the societal steering media to the organisations and it is 
possible that those working within organisations may not understand “the imperatives behind them” 
(Broadbent et al., 2010, page 507).  This could then impact on how the organisational members respond 
to attempts by the societal steering media to improve quality. There may be contradictions in the 
organisational responses to the regulatory controls, with some controls being considered acceptable and 
others seen as non-acceptable and, therefore, needing to be resisted. The complexities of organisational 
responses stem from the possibility of differing value systems being held by the organisations (e.g. 
hospitals) and societal steering media (e.g. Ministry of Health).  
Laughlin (1991) discusses four possible organisational responses to regulation: rebuttal, reorientation, 
colonisation and evolution. Rebuttal is the situation where organisational members find ways to deflect 
(and thereby reject) the controls emanating from regulation on the basis that as organisational members 
they know how the organisation functions. Often it is not possible for organisations to rebut external 
regulation especially where the regulation is backed by law and where it is transactional. In the 
reorientation response, the organisational members accept that the external regulations cannot be 
rebutted and they make some organisational changes to processes and functions whilst keeping their 
interpretive schemes (core beliefs, and organisational value systems) intact. Reorientation is a form of 
resistance, though less manifest than rebuttal. Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) argue that reorientation is 
the most common response to external regulations. Furthermore they identify two ways by which 
reorientation may happen: either by absorption or by boundary management. In the absorption situation, 
a specialist group is created within the organisation to cope with and “soak up” i.e. handle the 
disturbances whilst the main organisational activity continues (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013, page 
214). With the boundary management form of reorientation, a select group of senior managers lead 
changes in the daily activities of the organisation, whilst protecting the organisational interpretive 
schemes (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013, page 227). Rebuttal and reorientation are first order changes 
that do not involve the interpretive schemes changing. The other two change pathways, colonisation and 
evolution, both involve the underlying organisational interpretive schemes changing either through 
coercion (colonisation) or by agreement (evolution). Laughlin (1991) offers these pathways as skeletal 
conceptual frames in terms of middle range thinking, which can only be substantiated through empirical 
analysis.  
Our argument is that accreditation programmes are examples of regulatory control systems (i.e. steering 
mechanisms) that aim to steer hospital organisational activities through the accreditation standards. The 
standards need to provide real world guidance and should be reflective of situations faced by healthcare 
organisations, if they are to act as a catalyst for change (Duckett, 1983; Halverson et al., 1998). This 
suggests that there is a need for standards to be negotiated. Relational processes may facilitate the setting 
of appropriate standards which may satisfy the requirements of all stakeholders. Whether the processes 
associated with accreditations are transactional or relational requires empirical investigation.   
The Broadbent and Laughlin notions of transactional and relational steering provide a language for 
interrogating empirical findings about the nature of the standards, and the processes used in accreditation 
programmes. The term, rebuttal, reorientation, colonisation and evolution provide ways of analysing the 
responses of the participants to the programme. Previous studies that have analysed organisational 
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responses to institutional processes in healthcare organisations mainly using New Institutional Theory 
(e.g. Modell, 2001; Abernethy and Chua, 1996) and have found legitimacy seeking rationales to be key 
in explaining organisational responses. We draw on Broadbent and Laughlin’s ideas to render an 
institutional analysis that is “more sensitive to the wider, social implications” of accounting practices 
(Modell, 2015). Broadbent and Laughlin’s theoretical concepts enable a fuller analysis of the complex 
nature of regulation, whether they are transactional or relational, as well as a more nuanced analysis of 
the responses that organisations make to them. Such responses may be more complex than the desire for 
legitimation. Organisations may reorient themselves to the accreditation steer, but such reorientation 
may occur in different ways and for different reasons. As previous literature has shown resistance to 
regulatory controls happens when the organisational value systems are different and where the 
organisational changes contained in transactional steers are perceived as unrealistic and unattainable 
(Broadbent, Laughlin & Jacobs 2001). Reorientation, though a way of resisting the external control, may 
occur alongside conforming to the controls. Transactional steering leads to conformity because the 
controls are legally enforceable. Additionally, there may be conformity to transactional steers because 
of shared religious beliefs held by both the regulatory steering media and the organisational systems.   
4. Research methodology and methods 
4.1. Research methodology 
This study forms part of a major study that examines the performance management systems employed 
in Iranian hospitals. It adopts a mini case-study design using a purposive sampling technique for 
choosing the hospitals under inspection of the national accreditation program for hospitals in Iran 
(Kerssens-van Drongelen, 2001; Yin, 2008; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). All the hospitals were 
intentionally selected to reflect their participation in the accreditation program and they are all located 
in the same province and, therefore, subject to the same accreditation regime. The paper draws its 
empirical findings from mini-case studies from eight hospitals. Six out of the eight are publicly funded, 
whilst two are private (Table 2). Multiple mini-case studies allow an exploration of real-life phenomena 
although a limited amount of data may be collected from each case study (Kerssens-van Drongelen, 
2001). They enable the development of tentative explanations especially when the cases are based on 
theoretical replication (Kerssens-van Drongelen, 2001; Van Aken, 2005). It was thus possible to gain a 
broad view of organisational responses to the system (Van Aken, 2005). The aim is to gain an 
understanding of the perceptions of the organisational members in relation to the accreditation system, 
and to assess the extent to which they consider the system as transactional or relational.  
 
4.2. Research methods 
A purposive sampling technique was also applied for selecting the respondents. The main criterion was 
familiarity with and involvement in the accreditation and evaluation processes of the accreditation 
programme within the hospitals. Therefore, participants were selected according to their ability to 
provide appropriate data (Mack et al., 2005). We conducted face-to-face semi-structured interviews 
(Pope and Mays, 2006) with clinicians and managers including fifty-nine participants working in the 
eight hospitals and nine accreditation surveyors. The total of sixty-eight interviews took place between 
2009 and 2011. One of the authors went to Iran on several occasions to conduct the interviews, as he is 
fluent in Farsi. The Ministry of Health was mostly cautious about giving access to the sites. A range of 
documents (including letters from our university confirming the researchers’ affiliation) were required 
by the Bursary Committee, part of the Iranian Ministry of Health. Access to the hospitals was granted 
only after several months. A further long and bureaucratic process was followed inside each hospital 
before initiating the data collection. We reassured the management team and the participants of the 
purpose of the research and informed them about the research ethics of our institutions. A consent form 
indicating to them that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time were 
distributed to them. A Participant Information Sheet form explaining the purpose of this study was also 
given to them. Despite their busy schedule, they all accepted to participate in the research and the 
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interviews were finally pre booked. The interviewees were very cautious about providing inside 
information. Thus, further and continuous reassurance in terms of confidentiality and anonymity was 
again necessary before the interviews started. Nonetheless, they were very cooperative, mainly because, 
they indicated, they would like to see some change in the accreditation process. Attendance at meetings 
was not allowed. 
Analysis and review of the Ministry of Health’s official documents and an informal evaluation showed 
that the senior, middle and junior administrative and clinical managers from different hierarchical levels 
of each hospital were the most knowledgeable and deeply involved in accreditation process of the 
hospitals (see table 2). We also interviewed the accreditation surveyors (as outsiders; those who play the 
role of external controller), in order to corroborate information provided by the hospitals’ participants 
and minimise the potential for bias, - i.e. in an effort to increase the validity of the data and cross-checked 
them with relevant documents (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004).  
Table 2. The number of interviews conducted in the hospitals. 
4.3. Analysis of documentation and observation 
To develop further understanding of the process of the accreditation system in Iran, several documents 
were reviewed and analysed, including two groups - internal (related to hospitals) and external (issued 
by Ministry of Health) documents. This process was supplemented by interviews held with the 
accreditation surveyors. Both these interviews and the analysis of documentation were significant 
sources of information, enabling us to gain a fuller understanding of the context of the systems as well 
as the issues underpinning their rationalities - i.e. whether transactional or relational. 
One of the researchers was granted permission to participate in one accreditation program of one of the 
hospitals. This observation allowed perception of the way the system takes place in practice and the 
interactions between surveyors and hospitals’ staff. This provided further understanding of the 
participants’ actions and substantiated the data collected from the hospitals’ personnel in the absence of 
the surveyors. 
All the other sources were then translated and cross referenced and checked against other available 
primary data. Data was analysed both intuitively and through the use of computer-assisted qualitative 
data analysis software (NVivo-version 8 - CAQDAS). We employed the conceptual frame to help 
identify quotes and phrases from the interviews relating to participant perceptions about accreditation 
standards whether transactional or relational. We also considered the extent to which the responses of 
the interviewees signalled whether they were conforming to the accreditation steer or whether they 
seemed to be resisting the steer. One of the strengths of the middle-range thinking research approach is 
that it enables the drawing on “a rich source of primary data, with the benefits of an informed” skeletal 
approach to derive meaning and understanding of the empirical situation (Richardson et al, 1996, page 
10). Thus our theoretical model provided us with a language to enable us to interpret our findings. 
5. The Iranian National Accreditation Programme: a Regulatory Control System  
5.1. The Iranian Healthcare System Context 
Iran is a member-state of the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO)3 of the WHO and the 
healthcare system has been restructured and steadily improved during the past three decades (Mohit, 
2000). The Ministry of Health is the ultimate authority of the country’s healthcare – i.e. responsible for 
the aspects of planning, policy-making, leading, supervising, funding and evaluating the healthcare 
                                                          
3 EMRO includes countries from the Middle East and the northeast of Africa, such as Yemen, Lebanon and Morocco. 
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services and medical education (Mohit, 2000). In one document the Ministry of Health explains its 
responsibilities as (MoH-Ministry of Health 1997a):  
“…to define the principles of assessing, monitoring and controlling of healthcare institutions and to 
implement them.”  
The Ministry of Health specifies standards for healthcare services and is also responsible for financing 
health from public sources. Arguably, therefore, the role of the Ministry of Health is to steer in a 
transactional manner as it is responsible for financing, planning and assessment of performance of the 
healthcare centrally.  
At the provincial level executive responsibility has been given to the Universities of Medical Sciences 
and Health Services (the UMSs). The task of providing healthcare services and training the required 
human resources at all levels of education also concerns the UMSs (Bahadori et al, 2015; Farzianpour, 
et al., 2011; Majlis, 1985; 1987; 1988a). The chancellors of the universities, who are also the deputies 
of the health minister in their respective province, are the executive directors of the provincial care 
services and in charge of all hospitals and healthcare centres. Provision of healthcare services in Iran is 
undertaken at three levels; primary, secondary and tertiary. Primary care is mostly provided in rural areas 
by some basic health centres whereas secondary care includes the more advanced services and initial 
access to district hospitals. The tertiary care includes the UMSs and hospitals, which provide the most 
advanced healthcare services. Hospitals are conventionally recognised as organisations with a clinical 
orientation, with their main focus on the provision of care (Jacobs, 2001). The hospitals examined here 
were not seen as exceptions to this rule. Staff indicated that ‘serving the society as a hospital’ is the 
raison d’être of their organisation. The review of policy documents of the hospitals (e.g. strategic plans) 
and the interviews showed that the core of their mission is to deliver high quality and safe services to 
the satisfaction of their internal and external stakeholders.  
As explained earlier, the Iranian healthcare system comprises of both public and private care provision. 
The public hospitals are partly funded by the state through a central budget scheme. Private hospitals 
can either be for-profit and not-for-profit (charity) categories. The public hospitals are subdivided into 
university and institutional hospitals. These are also divided into two groups: teaching hospitals (which 
provide clinical services and undertake medical training, education and research) and the clinical 
hospitals (which are responsible only for delivering clinical services). The former, unlike the latter, are 
mostly located in the big cities of the provinces.  The university hospitals are governed and operated by 
the University of Medical Sciences. The University of Medical Sciences is also responsible for 
operationalising and implementing the accreditation and evaluation of hospitals within each province. 
Part of the hospitals’ revenue for both the private and public hospitals is determined by their income 
from the clinical services they provide. Clinical services are priced based on the accreditation grade of 
the hospitals signalling the importance of achieving a good grade from accreditation process (see table 
5), and arguably suggesting that the accreditation scheme is set up as transactional or as “something for 
something logic” (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013, page 261). Where hospitals meet the regulatory 
requirements set by the Ministry of Health, they are allowed to charge the highest rate for their clinical 
services. The accreditation rating status of private hospitals is used as a threshold for their eligibility to 
raise their tariffs for “hotel-type" services, (MoH-Ministry of Health 1997a), which are the main source 
of the private hospitals’ income. Within the private hospitals patients are usually treated in private rooms 
which have hotel-type facilities such as TV and menu choices. They are also referred to as customers. 
The higher the grade the private hospitals receive in their accreditation, the higher the tariffs they can 
charge for their hotel-type services, thus further increasing their income. Insurance organisations also 
reimburse the private hospitals according to their accreditation grade. This income for non - clinical 
hotel type services is a key stream of revenue for private hospitals.  
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In the analysis which follows next, we explain the nature of the accreditation processes and the effects 
it has on the organisational responses. 
5.2. Transactional development of standards  
The first attempt to introduce an accreditation system in Iran took place between 1962 and 1967. It 
started simply as a set of checklists and was developed on the basis of a USA accreditation system which 
was considered by Iranian authorities to be a successful scheme adopted internationally (Sadaghiani, 
1997; Shaw, 2004c). In 1994, the Joint Commission of International (JCI) introduced international 
accreditation health standards. These standards were considered the “best in the world” for quality 
healthcare and patient safety and became the basis for development of the Iranian national accreditation 
standards (Bahadori et al, 2015; Farzianpour et al., 2011). 
There are several steering organisations that operate together to accredit the hospitals. The Centre for 
Healthcare Accreditation and Supervision is a division created by the Minister of Health for undertaking 
policy-making, planning and direction of hospital accreditation and evaluation activities. There is a 
subdivision within this centre known as the Healthcare Organisations Evaluation Group which deals 
directly with planning and policy-making activities.   
The standards within the accreditation programme are established at macro level in the Ministry of 
Health and officially dispatched to the various UMS at micro level to be used for the accreditation of the 
hospitals. The existing documentation on the initiation of the national accreditation programmes shows 
that, in 1997, the formal guidelines for the accreditation were developed under the Treatment and 
Medication Undersecretary of the Government, and then placed to the convention of the Chancellors of 
the UMS and their Deputies for Treatment, and then finally sent to the hospitals to be observed in their 
practices (Moghimi, 2004; Sadaghiani and Zare, 2005). This approach to developing the accreditation 
system suggests that from the outset the purpose of the accreditation was one of control with the Ministry 
of Health taking the lead. Control is often a key purpose of transactional steering mechanisms (Broadbent 
and Laughlin, 2013, page 81).  This perception was constantly suggested by interviewees, as they argued 
that they could not affect the accreditation standards formally or informally as their feedback was not 
sought nor incorporated to introduce any changes. For example:   
“No feedback is asked from this hospital to improve the accreditation programme. We reflect on the 
problems though! But nothing has changed based on our views so far. What we say is mostly in an 
informal way and to the surveyors, because there is no formal process in place asking our feedback.” 
(Head of A&E: Hospital H. a public hospital) 
There are currently sixteen general domains of activity covered by the standards of the national 
accreditation programs for hospitals (Table 3). Each domain poses a number of questions and statements 
in the form of checklists in an attempt to cover all aspects of hospital activity (MoH- Ministry of Health, 
1997a).  
The set of accreditation standards listed in Table 3 indicates a considerable emphasis on the hospitals’ 
physical and structural aspects, input focus rather than processes and outcomes standards (e.g. standards 
6- establishment and physical structures; 7- Safety equipment; 8- Non-medical equipment; 9- Medical 
equipment; and 11- Information system and medical records). These represent 28.9 per cent of the total 
score. Standards 2, 3, 4, 5 and 13 relate to the administrative aspects of the hospitals, representing 41.4 
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per cent of the total score. Few standards are associated with output standards. For instance, Standard 
10 (patient satisfaction), which makes only 4.7 per cent of the total proportion4.  
It seems, therefore, that the focus of regulatory control was on the physical resources to ensure that the 
hospitals were equipped to offer services. This focus on structures and input resources was something 
interviewees commented on and something they seemed not to agree with. For example: 
“Checklists are mostly concerned with physical and structural matters and not with hospitals’ 
processes, whilst both should be covered by the accreditation programme.” (Matrons: Public Hospital 
F) 
A key objective of the Ministry of Health is to “provide facilities for public enjoyment of healthcare by 
establishing and expanding public health centres and improving their standard” (Malji, 1988, p.1) and 
therefore, from the perspective of the regulators, it is important to ensure this happened. As the 
documentary analysis of the evaluation checklists showed, surveyors tend to spend a significant amount 
of time checking the physical capacity of the hospitals to provide care. It has also been acknowledged 
by the authorities that the main focus of the accreditation programme is on the physical structures of the 
hospitals (Moghimi, 2004). The hospitals, as the above quote shows, seem to suggest that there should 
be an emphasis on processes rather than inputs. Here we see that some aspects of the hospitals’ 
organisational values differ from the contents of the accreditation standards. Whilst both the regulators 
and the hospitals are interested in the health of the Iranian people, the mission or intentions of the 
regulators were projected as being too focused on physical resources. 
In some cases, hospital departments exchange equipment to influence the accreditation scores whilst in 
other instances they claim to make unnecessary purchases. 
“…they [the accreditation surveyors] require expensive and unnecessary equipment that we cannot 
buy, so we may borrow them from other departments only for the period of the survey.” (Head of 
Laboratory: Private Hospital H) 
 “We are asked to buy some material or equipment that we don’t use too often and as a result of which 
the hospital incurs costs. But since it is a rule we must obey- e.g. buying a LP set, which is rarely 
used in this ward.” (Matron: Public Hospital F)  
 “We get prepared for the evaluation [by the NAPH] - sometimes superficially. We put some medical 
equipment such as “infusion pump or incubator” in our A&E which we do not use, and we believe 
they are not necessary… …we take them away and return them to its previous ward after the 
evaluation.” (Head of A&E: Hospital B-Public) 
 “We must prove the average time, after which a physician visits or nursing services are delivered to 
a patient arriving at the A&E, has reduced during a period of six months to get the related evaluation 
score. In practice, to be honest, this might not always happen in this department because of our 
shortage of staff. In busy times we bring staff from other departments to keep the waiting times down, 
but this is not possible in the long term... although their score is very low, they must be met, according 
to the regulations.” (Head of A&E: Hospital E-Private) 
 
                                                          
4 There are several studies finding no relationships between accreditation and patient satisfaction (e.g. Greco et al., 2001; 
Heuer, 2004). Similarly, patient-reported measures of quality and satisfaction of both accredited and non-accredited health 
plans could not be differentiated (Beaulieu and Epstein, 2002).  
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All these statements suggest attempts to comply with hospitals seeing the requirement as “a rule to be 
obeyed”. In effect the accreditation system is seen as one of “command and control”. But by borrowing 
equipment, the hospital is also resisting the steer to own equipment that they consider unnecessary. 
Therefore, it seems that the hospital staff are, at the same time, seeking to both conform and resist to the 
controls. There is some amount of gaming taking place to allow them to demonstrate compliance. 
Most interviewees indicated that they perceive the accreditation programme to be a top-down oversight 
system. The accreditation’s sole purpose, to them, is to remind staff of a need to meet a target number 
they considered to be meaningless and to engage in a seemingly meaningless and routinised process.  
“Evaluation activities have been routinised … - they are repetitive every year.”  (Head of ED: 
Hospital B) 
“…seeing similar evaluation process every year with the same checklists, honestly, I don’t bother to 
think of that seriously… When preparing for the evaluation, we sometimes do not try to go and 
check the checklists of the accreditation … we have memorised all what they may want and, 
therefore, we just change what is important for the evaluation.” (Matron: Hospital B) 
These quotes suggest that the steering inherent in the accreditation is seen by hospitals as transactional, 
and underpinned by instrumental rationality. That is to say, the standards are not established in a 
relational manner, through dialogue and seemingly do not seek the agreement of stakeholders, but rather 
compliance (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009; 2013). 
 
Table 3. Accreditation standards and corresponding scores for hospitals’ activities. 
Source: Adapted from Moghimi (2004, p. 26) 
 
In 2004, attempts were made to make amendments to the 1997 standards and to introduce new qualitative 
standards (MoH-Ministry of Health, 2004). Such attempts were to make the programme more ‘quality-
oriented’ (Moghimi, 2004). The idea was to update the standards gradually by adding more quality-
oriented standards. The aim was to encourage a focus on the quality of the service delivery in the 
hospitals (MoH-Ministry of Health, 2004). The Ministry of Health launched a supplementary 
programme called the ‘Practical instruction for the quality evaluation of hospitals’ as a pilot scheme 
from 2003, and in a compulsory fashion from 2004 (MoH-Ministry of Health, 2004). These guidelines 
were expected to accomplish three important goals as follows: 
“To assist with improving quality in hospitals; to provide necessary information for decision-
makers (possibility of informed decision-making); to enhance the level of accountability and 
regulation of HCOs.” (MoH-Ministry of Health, 2004, p. 2) 
These new standards specified what the government is looking for from hospitals, seemingly moving 
away from inputs to processes and outcomes and towards improving the quality of provision. They 
reasserted the government’s desire to ensure the hospitals’ ability to deliver quality and safe care and 
‘continuous quality improvement’ at all levels of the ‘general hospitals' activities (Moghimi, 2004, p. 5). 
Table 4 provides the quality-oriented standards developed as a result of the Government’s policy 
introduced in 2004. They are, therefore, part of the current hospitals’ accreditation (item 15 of Table 3). 
Although these indicators reflect a progress towards measuring quality in the hospitals, they only 
represent 2.9 per cent of the overall score of the accreditation for hospitals. 
Table 4.  Quality-oriented indicators of the accreditation programme 
  Source:   adapted from MoH-Ministry of Health, 2004 
 
The reaction of the hospitals was no different to these quality standards; they felt they had to comply 
with the standards though they did not agree with them. For example: 
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“In the case of nosocomial infection, they insist that we find more cases of patients with this condition 
and, if we report fewer cases, they will assume that our case-finding system is not working properly, 
while we think fewer cases should be better.” (Manager: Public Hospital C) 
Thus, what seems to be happening through the accreditation is the implementation of an ex ante 
accounting information system to monitor and control the hospitals irrespective of the views of managers 
and clinicians and irrespective of the interpretive schemes held by organisational members (Broadbent 
and Laughlin, 2013, page 78). Transactional ex ante information reflect exchange situations where 
something is given for something else (usually money). In the accreditation situation in Iran, meeting 
the specified standard would have a financial impact and therefore a considerable level of conformity 
resulted to enable the hospitals to gain the requisite score. But the development of standards was not 
based on a dialogue as to how to improve performance. Although the quality standards were to encourage 
continuous improvement in performance, the hospitals did not see them this way. Pomey et al. (2004) 
suggest that in Canada, the development of standards for continuous improvements, involving more 
professionals and enabled them to identify their organisational weaknesses, improving communication, 
but only marginally improving clinical practices. This differs from the Iranian situation where, it seems, 
the participants do not consider the potential learning from the standards. 
In many cases, the hospital participants felt that they do not have the capabilities to comply with the 
standards and that this had not been considered in the setting of standards. 
“It is not based on the hospital’s capability. We don’t think they evaluate what we have or are capable 
of doing.” (Supervisor: Private Hospital E) 
Therefore, there are problems with how the standards have been developed. Transactional steering 
approaches lead to conformity but a latent resistance to and the non-acceptance of accreditation standards 
underpins this conformity. Cooper et al. (2014) suggest that accreditations create institutional pressure 
for change in systems and organisations. Shaw et al. (2010) also suggest that in many countries, hospital 
systems change in preparation for accreditation. Where the standards are considered irrelevant, the 
participants may not feel any desire to meet them.  Hospitals may attempt to rebut the controls, but being 
unable to do so, may reoreintate their internal activities as they attempt to conform whilst actually 
resisting the controls. Further organisational resistance is shown to the accreditation system in response 
to how the standards are applied. 
5.3. Applying the Standards: Non-Negotiable and “unfair”  
Six months before the accreditation visit, hospitals are given the relevant forms to self-assess their 
performance against the indicators specified in Table 3 and 4. The completed forms are then handed to 
the surveyors. The surveying groups typically include two consultants from different disciplines such as 
internal medicine and paediatrics, two paramedics including one radiologist and one laboratory 
technician, one nurse, one medical equipment engineer, one establishment and construction expert, one 
administrative and personnel expert, one financial and budget expert, a team coordinator, healthcare 
management expert and other experts if required. A representative from insurance organisations is also 
a permanent member of this surveying group (Moghimi, 2004, p. 8).  
The surveyors score the hospitals on the basis of the self-assessed information. The surveyors act as peer 
reviewers, drawing on the self-assessment forms filled by the hospitals to conduct their review. Some 
guidelines are provided to assist the surveyors to assign related scores to the activities of the hospitals. 
Nonetheless, in most cases there are no guidelines, apart from the surveyors’ judgement on the basis of 
their observation and interviewing. 
The interviewees suggested that the manner in which the accreditation is conducted to apply the 
standards may be considered somewhat simplistic and non-negotiable, tending to depend mainly on the 
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subjective view of the surveyors. For instance, the surveyors check the list of equipment and award 
scores, but they do not assess whether the equipment is used or not.  
“The surveyors only check the existence of equipment; they have never checked whether we can use 
it or…” (Head of Para-clinic Dept.: Public Hospital F) 
Different hospitals complained about how their particular circumstances were not taken into account, 
for example: 
“According to our situation and capability as a single-specialty hospital, we are not able to completely 
fulfil the requirements of the accreditation program ... the standards are set for general hospitals and, 
therefore, impractical and unrealistic for us. For example, some equipment or services are not 
necessary in this hospital, but we are still asked to have them due to the compulsory nature of the 
accreditation’ (Manager: Hospital B)  
 
‘The evaluation is not based on the hospital’s capability. We don’t think they evaluate what we 
have or are capable of doing and offering to patients.’ (Supervisor: Hospital E) 
The hospitals also suggest that there is a mandatory nature to the accreditation which forces them to 
comply with surveyors' requests. For example; 
“Sometimes they (surveyors) for instance ask for the provision of a new service that is not to the 
benefit of the hospital, but we must comply with them in any case. It has a few times happened that 
the surveyors have asked for some documents that we do not think are worth preparing, but it is 
obligatory and we must draw up, when asked.” (Manager: Public Hospital C). 
The subjective approaches used in scoring hospitals lead to many concerns, primarily because hospitals 
do not understand how the scores are derived and, secondly, because they feel different types of hospitals 
are treated differently. 
“The scoring process is not clear for us. It is totally up to the surveyors’ judgements what score to 
give to the hospital. Therefore, we do not know how to perform to get the full score for an activity or 
process.” (Member of quality improvement office: Public Hospital F) 
A more relational approach to the application of standards could help hospitals to understand what 
changes the accreditation system are attempting to achieve, so staff could hold a more constructive view 
about the accreditation process. Pomey et al. (2004) for example, suggests that positive incentives such 
as training and accreditation awareness lectures could help accreditations to serve as an agent of change. 
Tension between private and public hospitals is visible because private hospitals hold the perception that 
the accreditation programme benefits the public hospitals. As Tables 3 and 4 portray, standards for both 
public and private hospitals are the same, since the main objective is ‘continuous quality improvement’ 
at all levels of hospitals’ activities (Moghimi, 2004, p. 5).  However, participants from private hospitals 
also feel aggrieved. 
“Surveyors assess this hospital more strictly than the public hospitals. They normally carry a negative 
view towards private hospitals … I know that the requirements of the accreditation programme are 
not properly observed in the public hospitals, as I have worked there. However, they normally get a 
better grade than us very easily.” (Head of A&E: Private Hospital H) 
“… I feel they [surveyors] don’t give us a fair score, because I don’t think it is fair to compare us 
with the other advanced public hospitals and evaluate our work by the same checklists of standards.” 
(Manager: Private Hospital E) 
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“They compare this hospital with publicly-funded advanced public hospitals, which is not fair in my 
perception.” (Supervisor: Private Hospital E) 
Private hospitals also indicate they are always distrustful of the evaluation results, because they do not 
have a representative in the evaluation team and the evaluation is performed by the surveyors of the 
universities and the Ministry of Health who belong to the public sector. Nonetheless, the public hospitals 
also echo their lack of faith in the accreditation system: 
“They (the surveyors) do not consider our “out-of-hand” limitations and capabilities in their 
evaluation.” (Manager: Public Hospital B) 
Both private and public hospitals seemed to share a distrust of the accreditation scores, albeit that they 
gave different reasons for this disbelief. Arguably, the similarity in views stems from the underpinning 
rationalities associated with the accreditation scheme. As Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) suggest with 
transactional steering,  
“Measures come first and either assumes to seek to define the implied values underlying these 
numbers…. ‘Ownership’ of the performance measurement systems may be difficult to achieve if the 
required ends do not reflect the taken-for granted organisational values” (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2009, page 287).  
In this case the subjective scoring of the hospital performance for both hospitals, whether private or 
public meant the ownership of the scores and the process was difficult to accept. Despite this, there is 
one aspect of the accreditation standards that all the hospitals are supportive of, since it is founded on 
shared interpretive schemes.  
5.4. Accreditation of religious standards and shared religious values 
Iran’s ethos is grounded on a multifaceted amalgamation of traditional and Islamic religious values 
(Hashemi and Postel, 2010). As table 3 demonstrates, the category of the standards related to religious 
and humane values represents ten per cent of the total range of scores that can be earned. One of the 
researchers observed a considerable number of spiritual and health care guidelines concerning healing 
and patients’ assistance displayed on the hospitals’ notice boards. This procedure corroborates many 
statements of this nature which are part of the instructions set by the hospitals’ evaluation policies set 
by the Government (e.g. MoH-Ministry of Health 1997a, 1997b). Islamic principles and law regulate 
and influence all aspects of life and is strictly adhered to. Questioning, ignoring or rejecting those 
standards is considered highly inappropriate, since they are grounded in shared religious beliefs, which 
is a key element that underpins the Islamic principles established in Iran. The set of questions composing 
these standards encompassed values based on compassion and ethics fitting with Islamic values. 
Therefore, scores are allocated according to the hospitals’ capacity to demonstrate that those principles 
are related to their daily practices, worship, healthcare needs and medical staff's ‘ethics'. The sets of 
questions contained in the standards established for the religious values included inter alia observing 
the religious values such as being compassionate to patients, paying attention to the ethical and emotional 
treatment of patients; meeting gender segregation requirements; ensuring that there is a religious centre 
in the hospital (this centre refers to an administrative body available to handle and manage the religious 
ceremonies). 
Since most of these religious values are not generated by people’s consensus, but based on the Islamic 
principles, they are seemingly not in conflict with people’s way of living and are more acceptable to the 
hospitals’ staff, who tend to conform to these particular standards without any challenge. Moreover the 
religious values, an example of Laughlin’s “cultural beliefs and values, (Laughlin, 1991, page 213) are 
shared by both the accrediting team and the hospital staff. Accordingly, hospital staff suggest that these 
shared religious beliefs provide the motivation for complying with all the demands of the accreditation 
programme (Jayasinghe & Soobaroyen, 2009; Lewis, 2001).  
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“…our motive for complying with the accreditation programme is helping patients. We hope that its 
guidelines help us to do this invaluable task ...” (Sister: Private Hospital E) 
“In any situation, we basically observe the religious values.” (Manager:  Public Hospital D) 
This was not surprising since “many Muslims around the world consider their beliefs to be the most 
important aspect of their spiritual essence, especially as they relate to daily practices, health care needs, 
medical ethics, and end-of-life treatment choices” (Abu-Ras and Laird, 2011, page 22). Islamic values 
and beliefs are important interpretive schemes that impact upon how the accreditation processes were 
understood. They believe their religious values help patients to recover and are keen to take on board 
any initiative that can assist them in this purpose. Abu-Ras and Laird (2011) suggest “the religious values 
and beliefs of Muslims are markedly different from those traditionally found in the Western Hemisphere” 
(Abu-Ras and Laird, 2011, page 48). This was evident in the interviews with hospitals' participants and, 
thus, the interviewer did not dwell on it, because of its taken for granted nature.  Commenting on the 
Iranian accreditation programme, Izadi et al. (2013) emphasise the importance in Iran of considering 
Islamic religious values within the accreditation systems, especially when standards derive from secular 
systems such as the JCI. Higher scores are often received by hospitals that comply with the religious 
standards and this influences how the whole regulatory programme is perceived. For example, Kamla et 
al. (2006) explains argue that in Islam the belief is that “more generally, life, prosperity, well-being and 
wealth are to be safeguarded and enhanced through mercy and justice” (Kamla et al., 2006, page 252).  
These sentiments suggest that, although the accreditation seemed to be transactional in approach, the 
strong shared religious values ensured conformity. This was the case despite the fact that different 
“measures of quality, relevance or excellence” seem to flow from the societal steering media (Broadbent 
et al., 2010).  
5.5. Periodic Site Review and Accreditation Outcomes 
The hospital accreditation visit is conducted annually beginning with a pre-arranged site visit by a team 
of surveyors. The visit usually lasts one week depending on the size of the hospitals and the number of 
in-patient beds. The site review is undertaken into two stages. The first review visit is to the accident 
and emergency (hereafter A&E) department, and is conducted independently of the remainder of the 
hospital. The second visit is the whole hospital assessment and it only takes place if the A&E obtains 
acceptable scores. This means that there is considerable pressure on both managers and clinicians to 
meet the standards for A&E. There are tensions between the managers and the clinical staff, which 
becomes evident during the preparations for the periodic site reviews element of the accreditation. 
Managers complain about the attitude of the clinicians. Many clinicians remained disengaged from the 
process, despite attempts by the hospital managers to find ways to encourage them to comply with the 
requirements of the accreditation programme. 
“Surveyors frequently refer to some problems related to the activities of our consultants (e.g. their 
low rate of attendance in the hospitals committee and meetings). But, this is not under our control.” 
(Manager: Public Hospital B) 
“We have problems with the clinicians who don’t comply with the requirements of the accreditation 
programme (e.g. filling the patients’ record completely). We try to encourage them to do so, because 
we lose points if it is not done properly. I try to do this through senior managers [director] of this 
hospital.” (Sister: Private Hospital E) 
Interviews with physicians indicate that they are either unaware of the accreditation programme or see 
it more as a formal activity that required compliance rather than a quality improvement mechanism.  
“I know there is an evaluation programme, but I am not aware what it does and what its standards 
are.” (Consultant: Public Hospital F)  
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In fact some clinicians suggested that the accreditation scheme does not have an impact on their work.  
“I don’t suppose the accreditation programme limits my freedom and independence, because it is only 
an annual checking system which stays just for a few days with us in the hospital.” (Head of ED: 
Private Hospital E) 
Seemingly, then, the accreditation scheme is neither intrusive nor freedom-reducing (at least for the 
clinicians) as is typical of transactional regulatory processes. Other studies on accreditations have shown 
that it is the nurse managers who take leadership roles in preparing for accreditation visits. It is in this 
respect that our findings are similar to these studies (Duckett, 1983; Pomey et al., 2004). Both the private 
and the public hospitals demonstrated the two aspects, professional (held by the clinicians) and 
managerial (held by the managers), often associated with healthcare organisations (Abernethy and Chua., 
1996; Kurumanki, 2004; Modell, 2001, Lehtonen, 2007). Nonetheless, whilst other studies show that 
accreditation preparations lead to “sharing of information and greater service integration” (Pomey, et al., 
2004, page 122), here there is a sense that clinicians are very powerful and they can choose not to engage. 
Most of the interviewees indicated that the quality improvement activities involving consultants do not 
progress properly, because they are reluctant to participate in and cooperate with such activities. Their 
tight schedules also seem to impact on their indifference toward the accreditation programme. 
 “…consultants tend to not attend the time requirements of the hospitals, because of the power they 
hold.” (Third-party surveyor) 
Supposedly, if the underpinning ethos of the accreditation scheme is relational, all stakeholders would 
have a shared concern for ways of improving processes and practices and this would emanate through 
the whole preparation for the visit. Transactional approaches are more attentive to outputs, the ends 
rather than the means.   
Where A&E departments do not achieve a satisfactory score (i.e. falling into the non-compliant category 
– grade 4; between 10869 – 13218, Table 5), the hospitals are given three months at most to rectify the 
problems and prepare for a re-evaluation of its A&E department. This scheme may induce hospitals to 
neglect their main activities to obtain higher grades for their A&E accreditation and then be able to move 
to the second phase of the process.  
During the second phase the surveyors investigate different aspects of the hospital activities, looking at 
medical equipment and clinical and paramedical spaces in an attempt to evaluate the hospitals 
holistically. They interview medical staff (mainly nurses) and sometimes patients, and finally they 
review the related documents.  
At the end of the accreditation visit, the surveyors are expected to hold a meeting with hospital managers 
to brief them on existing non-compliances against the standards. However, this briefing meeting still 
does not change the fact that hospital staff still do not understand how the scores the hospitals receive 
are derived. The final written report of the review is usually sent to the hospitals within a month of the 
site visit. Nonetheless, no suggestions on how to improve the scores are provided. Table 5 displays the 
range of scores and corresponding grades granted to the hospitals. The grade is used as a threshold for 
hospitals' eligibility to raise their tariffs for hotel-type services (MoH- Ministry of Health, 1997a).   
Table 5. The scoring system of the accreditation programme for hospitals 
Source: Moghimi (2004, p. 12) 
 
During interviews both private hospital managers and accreditation surveyors emphasised the 
importance of the high tariff to private hospitals especially. 
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“Our motive to complying with this accreditation programme is to get high tariffs; because without 
them it is difficult for us to survive. In fact, they are our main financial source.” (Manager: Hospital 
C, private hospital) 
 
“The main reason for [private] hospitals complying with the accreditation programme is to get high 
tariffs, since most of them are suffering from low income.” (Third-party surveyor) 
 
In the case of the private hospitals the accreditation scores can visibly have a significant impact on their 
activities. The public hospitals, on the other hand, are not as dependent financially on the results of the 
accreditation, since they do have significant income from the public finances.  
 
There are few differences in the attitude of private and public hospitals and, therefore, the standards 
employed in the accreditation process are the same for both. All hospital staff suggested that they would 
prefer departmental financial incentives to be associated with a higher grade.  
 
“There are no formal financial incentives for the departments that get higher score. They might get 
some rewarding leave or overtime hours which are very limited.” (Head of quality improvement 
office: Hospital D-Public). 
The lack of a clear reward at the individual and departmental level could remove the incentives for 
making efforts to achieve a better grade and performance (Custers et al., 2007). Although the financial 
impacts were gained through the services that the hospitals could provide, these impacts were not felt at 
the departmental or individual levels. Where a hospital is considered as non-compliant, namely 
achieving a grade four, it is given three months to improve its deficiencies and to solve the problems 
identified during the evaluation process. A final decision is made after a second visit to substandard 
hospitals.  Hospitals considered ‘substandard (Non-compliant)’, after a second visit, are prevented from 
providing some services to patients and those classified as ‘unauthorised’ can only work as a limited-
surgery clinic, rather than as a hospital. This further attests to the transactional nature of the scheme, 
explaining again why hospitals conformed to the regulatory control. 
 
In summary, the accreditation system as applied in Iran, although aimed at continuous improvement in 
quality of healthcare delivery, rather relies on many input standards. The accreditation scores of hospitals 
depend on subjective assessments made by survey teams. The outcome from the accreditations has some 
financial impacts at the organisational level, and thus the control system seemingly is transactional in its 
steering approach. Whilst the hospitals showed some resistance to the process, they do comply with its 
requirement, suggesting some amount of reorientation of organisational activities. The shared cultural 
interpretative schemes of religious values tend to make the accreditation seem more acceptable than it 
might have done. The next section discusses these organisational responses to accreditation system and 
concludes our study. 
 
6. Discussion and final considerations  
We argue in this paper that an accreditation programme is an example of a regulatory control system 
attempting to change hospital activities through the standards against which they are assessed. 
Understanding organisational participants' perceptions of these standards, the accreditation process and 
the outcomes are important for assessing the effectiveness of accreditation systems and whether they 
can lead to organisational change. We analyse the perceptions of the hospitals’ participants in Iran to the 
Iranian National Accreditation of Hospitals Programme. Our findings show that, whilst there is some 
amount of resistance to the scheme, hospitals tend to conform to its requirements; in some cases even 
fabricating evidence in their bid to and demonstrate compliance. The key factors explaining conformity 
include the compulsory nature of the process, the financial impetus and the shared religious values. In 
effect the transactional nature of the process and the outcomes associated with the accreditation enable 
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conformity. Resistance, on the other hand, is driven by the perceived inappropriateness of the standards. 
The resistance remains covert rather than overt. These reactions together (i.e. conformity and resistance) 
are suggestive of a reorientation response (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013; Laughlin, 1991).  
Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) suggest that reorientation strategies, where there is resistance to 
regulatory controls, take place through absorption practices or through boundary management. With 
absorption, the organisation manages “unwanted intrusions” by soaking them up through the activities 
of specialist working groups thereby protecting the core activities (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013, page 
213). With reorientation by boundary management, senior managers act as a conduit for the external 
regulators, whilst protecting the interpretive schemes of the organisation. In both cases there are 
organisational changes, but the core organisational values are protected from the intrusion.  
In this particular case of accreditation of hospitals in Iran, the responses made to the accreditation 
processes were attempts by organisations to conceal their inability to meet the standards. There is no 
evidence of boundary management, nor evidence of absorption.   Reorientation took place in the form 
of some amount of gaming.  
This form of reorientation takes place because the nature of the standards set to grade hospitals activities 
are perceived as unrealistic, as previous citations indicate. The perception is that the accreditation 
standards do not highlight the strengths of the hospitals nor do they reveal their weaknesses and mistakes. 
Hospitals simply receive a list of grades related to their main activities, but they still do not get 
explanations and/or suggestions on how to improve them. There is the suggestion that some of the 
accreditation’s requirements exceed hospitals’ capacities and facilities and, therefore, they are assessed 
on aspects over which they have no control (e.g. human resources). This situation led to a sense of 
indifference, lack of ownership and sometimes indignation.  
Shaw (2000) suggests that standards should be developed or adapted to reflect national legislation, 
economics, culture and demand, rather than being replicated globally, as it is the case of Iran. Where the 
standards have been adjusted to reflect the context, such as the inclusion of religious standards, the 
accreditation was deemed acceptable, otherwise they are resisted. In this case the resistance was hidden 
because of the compulsory nature of the system. Pomey et al. (2004) argue that the institutional pressures 
created by compulsory accreditations need to be backed by incentives to encourage organisations to 
engage meaningfully in the process, through learning and training. In effect, the processes of 
accreditation (standards development, application of standards, self-assessment etc.) can be used to 
encourage organisational change. We do not see this happening in this case study. Cooper et al. (2014) 
also signal the important role powerful interests (in their case, academic Deans) can play in championing 
issues within the standards to instigate change. Rather, what we see in Iran is the perception that the 
standards are inappropriate.  
As Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) argue, in transactional approaches to control, the measures come first 
and are developed on assumed values. A more relational and discursive approach could create an 
opportunity for hospitals to reflect on and improve their own performance. Their knowledge could be 
incorporated in the definition of standards. Where more relational mechanisms are used to regulate and 
there is more discussion of the causes and effects of actions between organisations and their regulators 
(Broadbent et al., 2010), they develop a shared understanding of issues pertaining to hospitals.  Quality 
of care may require standardisation but it should not discourage autonomy and creativity. 
Whilst the Iranian case shows latent resistance, there is a significant level of conformity to the 
accreditation programme. Hospitals conformed to the accreditation for three reasons, the possible 
financial benefits associated (especially in the case of private hospitals) with it at the organisational 
level, its compulsory nature, and the shared religious values that all parties held. 
Firstly, the accreditation programme in Iran is premised on the transactional approach of “something for 
something”, for the financial transfers the organisations receive there is a need for performance 
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accountability by meeting the accreditation standards.  However, the financial impacts of accreditation 
performance were seen differently by the private and the public hospitals. The financial consequences 
for the public hospitals were seen by the private hospitals as negligible, since the public sector hospitals 
in Iran are funded by the Government and, therefore, have a stable source of funding. There seemed to 
be no apparent financial penalty for the public hospital in the event of them not achieving the desired 
standards of the accreditation system. However, these public hospitals theoretically could be demoted to 
clinics and the type of service provided by them altered. In this respect, it seems the accreditation system 
as operated in Iran is similar to other public management performance measurement systems .Whilst 
accreditations are often differentiated by their “non -punitive nature” (Montague,2003), in this case study 
there seems to be elements of punishment associated with the system. The public sector hospitals were 
compelled to conform. 
The situation was different for the private hospitals that faced constant and continuing financial 
difficulties. It was therefore imperative for them to achieve a high score, which impacted on the tariff 
they set for their services. The fabrication of pre-evaluation documents was an attempt to meet the 
demands of the A&E standards (table 4) in order to gain the financial resources. The fact that they are 
prepared to go to this extent shows the significance of money as a steering mechanism (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2009, page 292). It also demonstrates the problems that transactional regulatory processes 
may face when there is not a market to set prices to deal with the transfers of money. The expectations 
of the regulators (in this case the desire for improved quality of health care) stand the risk of not being 
achieved where the financial flows are necessary but not considered sufficient enough  to drive the 
organisational changes necessary to meet the standards. 
All the hospitals participated in the accreditation programme, because it is legally required. The 
mandatory nature of the programme means hospitals cannot opt out: the accreditation has legal support. 
The accreditation is a mode of governance that can exert disciplinary power over the hospitals by 
preventing them from providing services. Therefore, there is conformity because of the fear the hospitals 
have of being closed down if they do not reach the required standard. The state has enormous power and 
could wield this on hospitals.  
A close look at the case seems to suggest that the hospitals’ interviewees are also prepared to conform 
to the accreditation requirements, because of shared religious values. The Islamic values are very strong 
interpretive schemes that are taken for granted and that underpin all aspects of life in Iran. The inclusion 
of religious standards within the accreditation has been heralded and was intentionally included to ensure 
the acceptability of the process to believers (Izadi et al., 2013). Thus, even if the accreditation 
programme is seemingly transactional, it is taken as a relational process, although it is not based upon 
deliberation and negotiation. In discussing relational steering, Broadbent et al. (2010) do not develop the 
bases on which relational steering may be founded. Nevertheless, they point to the complexities 
associated with actual practices. For example, in their study of Higher Education in the UK, they argue 
that many of the regulatory controls pass through intermediate organisations that can reshape the 
transactional controls, making the processes more relational. This study suggests that, whilst the 
accreditation standards reflect transactional definition of standards, or the ends required, the means or 
processes of working towards these standards may be underpinned by shared religious values. In effect, 
transactional steering need not be undertaken in a “command and control” manner.  
Our argument is that the responses of the hospitals reflected reorientation rather than colonisation. 
Reorientation recognises that the regulatory controls must be managed to enable the organisational 
activities to continue without change to the organisational interpretive schemes. Broadbent and Laughlin 
(2013) argue that colonisation involves forced changes in the interpretive schemes of organisations. 
There is a fundamental shift in the “genetic code” of the organisations being controlled such that they 
take on the values contained in the regulatory controls. We did not see this taking place in the 
accreditation programme as it operates in Iran; the hospitals continued to focus on their key mission of 
improving the health of the Iranian people.  
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To conclude our specific case, we have argued that the hospital accreditation programme of Iran is a 
regulatory control system that shows signs of transactional steering. However, in the context of Iran, and 
the shared underpinning religious beliefs in which the programme is implemented, the dichotomy of 
transactional and relational steering may not be as sharply divided as may be the case in other settings. 
In Iran, the elements of accreditation associated with Islamic values are taken for granted and are 
“amenable to substantive justification” and, therefore, regulative because they regulate established 
behaviour and are not considered to be reducing the freedom by which the organisations act (Laughlin 
and Broadbent, 1993, page 341). Nevertheless, other aspects of the accreditation are less well accepted; 
but they are still accomplished, due to the material financial recompense that they entail - i.e. "something 
for something' associated with transactional steering. This recognition reasserts the importance of 
studying control systems in the context in which they operate.  
On a more general policy level, our study has shown that accreditations as control systems offer the 
accreditor an opportunity to impact on how activities are undertaken. Nonetheless, as with other systems 
of control, the goals of the control system need to be agreed and shared by all stakeholders who will 
have a part to play in achieving the objectives. Healthcare organisations need to work with the accreditor 
(the government, in this case) on all the three stages - i.e. developing and applying standards and the 
periodic review to enable an effective accreditation programme to impact on the quality of healthcare. 
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